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Abstract: By providing a long run reconstruction of regional Net Fiscal Flows (NFFs) in Italy 
throughout the last six decades (1951-2010), this paper documents the substantial rise of fiscal transfers 
to Mezzogiorno (i.e. Southern Italy) from the rest of the country. Besides, three further arguments are 
presented. First, we find that the prominent upsurge of NFFs in 1980s and 1990s has exerted a scarce 
impact on the North-South gap, mainly because it has not been connected to a stronger commitment in 
supply-side regional and development policies, and the needed rise of capital expenditure in 
Mezzogiorno. Second, we ascribe most of the increase in NFFs to the generalized escalation in current 
primary expenditure related to the “decentralization without accountability” design of fiscal reforms 
implemented in the 1970s. Third, we evaluate the size of interregional redistribution in the light of 
regional income differences and the burden imposed to contributing regions. By making use of several 
indexes and analytical procedures intensively used in the literature, we reach the conclusion that 
interregional redistribution in Italy has been moderate, considering the severity of initial differences in 
economic and social conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
The dualistic structure of the Italian economy is unique among the countries of the European Union, for 
both the width of the gap between rich and poor regions and the geographic size of the relatively 
underdeveloped area – the so-called Mezzogiorno –, which accounts for more than 40% of national 
territory. Despite more than 60 years of regional policies, GDP per capita in the regions of 
Mezzogiorno (i.e. Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria plus the islands Sicily 
and Sardinia) is nowadays still around 60% of that of Centre-North, GDP per worker around 80% and 
the unemployment rate nearly twice as much as the national average. 
The presence of large and long-lasting differences between North and South of Italy in many 
indicators of economic and social development has urged public intervention and a strong financial 
commitment by central and local governments for the implementation of policies sound to promote 
regional convergence and territorial rebalancing, at least since the 1950s. Characterized by different 
strategies, intermediate objectives and financial constraints, any public policy designed to fill the 
economic gap and apply the constitutional precepts (citizens’ equality in accessing essential public 
services and progressivity criteria in income taxation) has to some extent involved an inevitable 
redistribution in favor of Mezzogiorno from the more affluent Northern regions. This has originated an 
ongoing debate on the size of the Southern Net Fiscal Flow (NFF), i.e. the difference between total 
public expenditures targeted to Mezzogiorno regions and public revenues raised from that area
1
, as well 
as on the burden imposed on contributing regions, its economic sustainability and even possible 
consequences on country stability, territorial conflict and incentives to secessions. 
The relevance of this issue is clearly not restricted to the Italian case, which is both a particularly 
controversial one and peculiar since Italy is not even a federal country. A flourishing literature on the 
interregional redistribution operated through fiscal flows (see for example Bayoumi and Masson 1995, 
Barberán et al. 2000, Bosch et al. 2002, Rodden et al. 2003, Bosch et al. 2010) has pointed out how the 
issue is multifaceted and contentious in many countries, especially for the difficulty to single out how 
much of vertical (from central to local governments) and horizontal (from rich to poor local 
governments) transfers are worth (i.e. can be actually ascribed to the genuine purpose of offsetting 
geographical disparities) or instead unjustified and due to other motivations such as: a) political 
                                                             
1
 Postponing details on the definition of NFF to section 3, it is however the case to recall here that in the literature NFF 
takes on a variety of other names, such as fiscal residuum, fiscal balance, net fiscal transfer and so on.   
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interests, lobbying, corruption which often drive decisions on public resources’ redistribution, and b) 
inefficiencies in the provision of local public services which inflate costs and call for bailouts. 
The subject of this paper is closely connected to this debate. Our objective is threefold: we intend 
first to carry out a historical reconstruction of regional NFFs throughout the last six decades, aiming at 
estimating the size of interregional redistribution and its evolution over time. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is an unprecedented attempt, since existing literature has solely dealt with short time 
spans so far. Secondly, we focus on the potential benefits of redistribution, especially the possible 
resulting reduction of the North-South socio-economic gap. This is done by exploring facts and data 
which connect the dynamics of regional NFFs with the evolution of the North-South divide. Thirdly, 
we focus on the costs of redistribution meant as the weight imposed on the rest of the country, in terms 
of the amount of transferred financial flows, taking into account the differences in interregional GDPs 
which justify public intervention. By doing so, we seek to give an assessment on the intensity and 
adequacy of the redistributive effort in favour of Mezzogiorno.  
On the other hand, disentangling the shares of due and undue redistribution in Italian regional 
NFFs goes beyond our purposes: while we firmly believe that the opportunistic and inefficiency 
motives behind governments’ redistribution policies are distortions to fight (Padovano 2007; 2012), we 
also deem that in general they are not a good enough reason to give up public intervention for social 
inclusion and economic convergence of lagging regions. 
After this introduction, section 2 summarizes the main issues of the discussion on the Southern 
financial dependence on fiscal transfers, its origins and motivations and the recent developments. 
Section 3 covers the long run reconstruction of regional NFFs, by building up (discontinuous) time 
series of public revenues and expenditures for regions and four macro-regions (i.e. groups of regions 
named North-West, North-East, Centre and Mezzogiorno)2. Section 4 is devoted to jointly analyze the 
dynamics of regional NFFs and the evolution of the North-South gap. As we will see in detail, facts and 
data do not seem to show any clear relationship between interregional redistribution and regional 
convergence. Section 5 gives an assessment on intensity and adequacy of the redistributive effort in 
favor of Mezzogiorno. Our evaluation, based on the calculation of indicators and the implementation of 
techniques widely used in the international literature, is that Mezzogiorno has benefited from large and 
increasing levels of transfers of public resources, but nevertheless the intensity of redistribution can 
                                                             
2
 The geographical aggregation of Italian regions in “macro-regions” presented here is often used in the literature. It splits 
the country in four parts named North-West (Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Lombardy, Liguria), North-East (Veneto, Trentino 
Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna), Centre (Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio) and Mezzogiorno. 
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hardly be judged excessive, considering the inequality of regional GDPs and the constitutional 
principles of citizens’ equality in accessing public services. Section 6 concludes the paper with a 
summary of our main conclusions. 
 
2. The North-South dualism and interregional redistribution: a long standing discussion 
Early empirical studies on the regional redistributive effects of public finance in Italy date back to 
Pantaleoni (1891) and Nitti (1900). These two studies share the following conclusion: in the post-
unitary period, the South suffered from a consistent drain of public resources following the extension of 
the fiscal system of the Kingdom of Sardinia to the other pre-unitary States. As a matter of fact, the 
1861 Italian unification brought about two main facts causing Mezzogiorno to contribute to the 
financing of national public budget to a higher extent than the North, despite its lower per capita 
income and population. First, the fiscal system of the Kingdom of Sardinia was characterized by a 
higher number of taxes and tributes as well as higher average tax rates. Hence, its extension to the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies led to increased fiscal pressure in the provinces of Mezzogiorno. Second, 
the governments of the time targeted the North with high levels of public investment for infrastructures 
aimed to support the ongoing industrial take off of local economies, while for the South an agricultural-
based model of development was preferred. 
Pantaleoni (1891) provides the first attempt to evaluate regional fiscal pressure relative to the 
regional distribution of national wealth for the years 1884-1889. The fiscal burden attributed to each 
region includes taxes levied on income, business activities, consumption and lotteries. In the absence of 
figures on regional income and wealth, the author first estimates the regional shares of national wealth 
by using the regional distribution of estate tax revenues; then, by comparing the regional distributions 
of fiscal burden and wealth, he shows how the uneven (i.e. not proportional to wealth) regional 
distribution of fiscal burden across regions favors residents in the North of the country. In fact, 
Northern regions (Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Veneto) hold 48% of national wealth, bearing only 
40% of national fiscal burden; for Central regions (Emilia, Tuscany, Marche and Lazio) the 
corresponding figures are 25% of wealth and 28.5% of taxes; for Mezzogiorno 27% of wealth and 
32.5% of taxes. 
Nitti (1900) delivers for the first time regional estimates of the distribution of both tax burden and 
public expenditure for the years 1893-94 and 1897-98. On the tax revenues side, his conclusions agree 
with Pantaleoni: fiscal pressure comes out to be relatively higher in the South, the gap being larger for 
income taxes. Likewise, he finds evidence of a clearly uneven regional distribution of public spending 
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in favor of the North, especially for military expenditures (at that time the main category of primary 
public expenditure), public investment in infrastructures, public security and public workers’ salaries3. 
Summarizing, in the view of Nitti, during most of the first 40 years after unification, the combination of 
higher fiscal pressure and lower public spending in the South produced a net flow of public resources 
toward the North. Northern tax payers were indeed contributing to the financing of public services by 
less than their potential fiscal capacity, while benefiting from relatively higher per capita levels of 
public services than the South
4
. 
The results of Pantaleoni (1891) and Nitti (1900) are criticized by Gini (1962) who argues that 
the methodological flaws of those studies in the estimation of the regional distribution of wealth and 
fiscal burden are so severe to imply strongly biased results
5
. Nevertheless, his own estimations, 
obtained after a number of methodological corrections, yield a regional distribution of the fiscal burden 
very similar to the one by Nitti. On the other hand, he concludes that the lack of more detailed data 
makes it just impossible to consistently compare the tax contribution of an average tax payer with the 
benefit received in terms of public services. 
After Nitti (1900), none other empirical investigation has attempted to get reliable estimates of 
the regional distribution of public spending until the 1960s. Conversely, much effort has been devoted 
to the estimation of fiscal pressure at the regional level, and the debate mostly focused on size and 
direction of the implied fiscal redistribution among the macro-regions of the country. In this vein, 
Bernardino (1928) and Zingali (1933) reach opposite conclusions by looking at the years just before 
(1911-13) and after (1919-21) the First World War. A major feature of Bernardino (1928) is the 
regional repartition of excise and customs duties, made under the assumption that their incidence in a 
given region be proportional to the amount of all other taxes collected in the same region. Following 
this assumption, the contribution of Northern regions to tax revenues is estimated at about 58.9%, while 
                                                             
3
 In detail, Nitti found that military expenditure in the North was about twice as much as in the South, even if only half of 
the army was located in the Northern regions. Payments of the Ministry for Public Works (including public investment in 
railways) were as well considerably higher in the North. 
4
 Many years later, Giarda (1982) reaches similar conclusions: the South contributed to national tax revenues by more than 
its own fiscal capacity in the years 1860-1897; with particular reference to 1897-1898, per capita fiscal burden was 7.5% 
higher in the North than in the South, although the difference in per capita income among the two areas was not lower than 
30%.  
5
 The main limitation of the work carried out by Pantaleoni and Nitti rests in the use of data on taxes collected in a given 
region as the indicator for fiscal pressure in that region, which overlooks the problem of the geographical distribution of the 
real incidence of taxes. This shortcoming is due to the unavailability of data suitable for the apportionment of taxes 
according to the incidence criterion. Furthermore, Nitti estimates the regional distribution of different categories of public 
expenditure by using only data on the Ministries’ payments settled by Provincial Treasuries thus ignoring the problem of 
allotting at the regional level the payments settled by the Central Treasury. 
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their share of wealth amounts to 53.5%. On the other hand, the South contributes to tax revenues by 
less than its share of wealth (8.3% versus 11.2% in the islands and 18.7% versus 21.0% in the 
remaining Southern regions). The higher contribution of the North as compared to its fiscal capacity is 
estimated to be even greater in the period 1919-21. Zingali (1933) criticizes the methodology of the 
regional allotment of taxes employed by Bernardino. As a result of his adjustments, Zingali finds the 
North to be beneficiary of a net transfer of resources. 
Soon after the Second World War, the debate is revitalized by the availability of new data 
allowing for more appropriate regional sharing of fiscal burdens. In particular, regional data on 
consumption become available and this makes it possible to provide estimates of the distribution of 
indirect taxes based on their actual geographical incidence. Employing this additional information, but 
considering two different spans of time, i.e. respectively 1952-53 and 1953-34, and using different 
methods to evaluate the regional incidence of taxes, De Meo (1955) and Stammati (1955) find starkly 
different results. According to De Meo, Northern regions contribute 59.1% of total tax revenues while 
accounting for 61.3% of national income; Central and Southern regions respectively pay 20.7% and 
18.6% of total taxes and produce 19.0% and 17.8% of national income. Instead, Stammati (1955) 
maintains that the North contributes to national tax revenues by more than its own fiscal capacity. 
The first attempt to supply regional estimates of both tax revenues and public expenditure after 
Nitti (1900) is made by Tarquinio (1969). This study, using cash-flow data on revenues (collected 
taxed) and payments (public spending), registered by Provincial Treasuries and reported in the “Conto 
Riassuntivo” (Summary Statistics) of the Ministry of Treasury from 1951 to 1965, suffers from two 
main limitations. First, as noticed by Forte et al. (1978), tax collected and/or payments settled by a 
given Provincial Treasury are not necessarily linked to economic facts taking place in the same 
Province; as Tarquinio himself recognizes, public works carried out in Naples could in principle be 
paid by the Provincial Treasury of Milan, or vice versa. Second, Tarquinio does not consider the 
payments settled by the “Tesoreria Centrale” (Central Treasury); moreover, he takes into account only 
of a share of the payments settled by the Provincial Treasury of Rome. These omissions, according to 
Geri and Volpe (1985), imply that only 45% of total public expenditure is actually attributed to regions, 
while the remaining 55% is left out of the picture. On the other hand, Tarquinio (1969) presents three 
important merits. First of all, this study fills a research gap after many years. Second, unlike previous 
investigations, it uses actual public finance data, rather than data estimated from the distribution of 
personal income, personal wealth or other macroeconomic variables available at the regional level. 
Finally, it considers a remarkably long span of time. Its main results indicate that Northern regions 
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have benefited from a relatively higher level of public expenditure, while the regional disaggregation of 
the tax burden shows a slight relative advantage for Southern regions in terms of both fiscal pressure 
and per capita fiscal burden. This evidence leads the author to conclude that between 1951 and 1965 
ordinary public resources have mainly been allotted to territories in accordance with their economic 
weight in terms of share of GDP and political importance, despite the rebalancing goals of the ongoing 
“Intervento Straordinario” (Special Aid Program) for the development of Mezzogiorno.  
The onset of “Regioni a statuto ordinario” (regional governments) in the early 1970s represents a 
structural break to the national tradition of strong centralization of the public sector. Fiscal 
decentralization and the presence of different levels of government bring about additional difficulties 
for a correct imputation of revenues and expenditures to the different regions. Forte et al. (1978) and 
Geri and Volpe (1985) try to cope with such difficulties in two alternative ways and reach very 
different conclusions. Forte et al. (1978) find a strong North to South redistribution, while Geri and 
Volpe (1985) identify in the regional distribution of public spending the source of a relative advantage 
for the North.   
Forte et al. (1978) estimate regional fiscal imbalances for the years 1971-1973 by using a number 
of indicators to proxy the regional distribution of taxes and public expenditure items. The evidence they 
collect allows them to document the existence of a significant drain of resources from the North to 
Mezzogiorno in the considered period. This North-South redistribution occurs through both a lower tax 
pressure and (especially) a higher expenditure in the South. More importantly, according to Forte et al. 
(1978), redistribution seems to be more effective in reducing current disposable income differences 
than filling the infrastructural and production gap between the two areas.       
Geri and Volpe (1985) regionalize public expenditure flows in the 1970s by following the 
alternative strategy of using actual data retrieved from the “Conti consolidati del settore pubblico” 
(Public Administration General Accounts) in order to provide a quantitative assessment of the regional 
relative (dis)advantage produced by the allocation of public resources for the years 1971, 1975, 1977 
and 1981. To do that, they compare the regional shares of public spending with the regional distribution 
of population and GDP, so identifying two stable patterns for Northern and Southern regions. On the 
one hand, Northern regions receive a share of public expenditure that is proportional to inhabitants but 
below their contribution to the formation of national income. On the other hand, the share of public 
expenditure received by the South is lower than the share of population but higher than their 
contribution to national GDP (Geri and Volpe, 1985, p. 250). More importantly, the fairness of the 
regional distribution of public expenditure is evaluated by analyzing disaggregated data on current and 
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capital expenditure. The richer Northern regions benefit from higher per capita levels of current public 
spending with respect to Southern regions, this pattern being stable for the whole 1970s. On the other 
hand, consistent with the territorial cohesion objective, per capita public investment turns out to be 
higher in the South, although this relative advantage progressively declines over the considered period. 
Since the mid-1990s the political discussion on regional fiscal imbalances has been increasingly 
characterized by claims on a presumed excess in transfers of public resources from the North to the 
South, with many advocates of the federalist reform
6
 conceiving fiscal decentralization as a tool to 
empower Central-Northern regions to retain their own resources otherwise wasted in Mezzogiorno. The 
need to offer documented research about this issue, on which the debate has been often distorted by 
partisan attitudes, has spurred the recent resurgence of interest on the topic of interregional 
redistribution, also favored by the great improvement in the quality and quantity of data. Since 1996, 
the Italian Economic Development Ministry has started to systematically collect data on public 
revenues and expenditures at a regional level, providing the publicly available dataset of “Sistema 
Conti Pubblici Territoriali” (Regional Public Accounts System)7. These data represent a valuable 
source of information and have been indeed extensively used in a number of studies for the purpose of 
estimating regional NFFs or other facets of the North-South redistribution. 
The main recent contributions include Pisauro (2009), Staderini and Vadalà (2009), Ambrosanio 
et al. (2010), Arachi et al. (2010), Grasso and Garganese (2010), Ferrario and Zanardi (2011), Giannola 
et al. (2011), Arachi et al. (2013), Cerea (2013), and Piperno (2013). Although these studies are 
heterogeneous for objectives, approaches, time spans (within the period 1996-2010) and even for data 
and computation methods, they share some basic conclusions. The most important common results are 
the following: a) a substantial amount of resources is transferred every year from Centre-North to 
Mezzogiorno; b) the Southern gap in per-capita income and the endowment of socio-economic 
infrastructures at least partly justify differences in per capita revenues and outlays originating NFFs; c) 
halting interregional redistribution might involve heavy negative effects on Mezzogiorno and uncertain 
advantages for the North. On the last issue Pisauro (2009) argues that “There are no alternatives. The 
                                                             
6
 After the introduction of regional governments between 1972 and 1977, since the 1992 a reform process aiming at 
adopting a more decentralized fiscal framework gets under way. In 2001 the Constitution is changed to recognize a wider 
scope to local governments’ action. More recently, fiscal autonomy has been enhanced by law 42/2009.          
7
 See the websites http://www.dps.tesoro.it/cpt/cpt.asp and http://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/ for more detailed information. These 
data can be usefully complemented by additional information supplied by the “Ragioneria Generale dello Stato” (State 
General Accountancy). 
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tenet for which more federalism and less redistribution are a good solution even for the South is not 
convincing. (…) There is instead evidence to expect increasing inequality”). 
In the view of Giannola et al. (2011), when considering the extent of Mezzogiorno gap, the 
evidence of a sizeble interregional redistribution from the North to the South is not a sufficient support 
to the view that transfers in favor of Mezzogiorno operated through the public sector are “too high” and 
that they impose an excessive burden to residents of contributing Northern regions. In fact, in the light 
of the dualistic structure of the Italian economy, redistribution is to some extent an inevitable effect of a 
progressive taxation system and constitutional principles which oblige government to pursue citizens’ 
equality in accessing public services and to act for the development of less advanced territories. Hence, 
in order to conclude that actual NFFs are “too high” one should contrast them with “benchmark” values 
consistent with the constraints set up by the constitutional precepts of tax progressivity and citizens’ 
equality. By making this comparison, Giannola et al. (2011) conclude that for most centre-northern 
regions actual NFFs are lower than their “benchmark” counterparts, i.e. Mezzogiorno – at least for 
years 2004-2006 – has not benefitted from excessive redistribution8. 
 
3. A reconstruction of regional Net Fiscal Flows in Italy, 1951-2010 
3.1. Methodology 
This section is devoted to a reconstruction of regional public revenues, expenditures and NFFs in Italy 
throughout the period 1951-2010. Going back in time to six decades, a major difficulty of this task is 
connected to the lack of primary (i.e. coming from direct sources) data, at least for years prior to 1996. 
This problem obliges to resort to secondary data available from indirect sources, i.e. studies that 
provide estimates of regional tax revenues and public expenditures, with reference to different spans of 
time. In particular, in what follows we employ data drawn from Tarquinio (1969) for the years 1951 to 
1965, Forte et al. (1978) for the years 1971 to 1973, ISTAT (1996) for the years 1983 to 1992, and 
Fondazione Agnelli (1998) for the year 1995. 
In order to deal with the heterogeneity of sources, we conduct a careful screening of both the 
items included and excluded in the calculation of aggregate variables and the methods employed for 
computation/estimation in each study. Then, we make the needed adjustments to make comparisons 
sensible: details on these adjustments are given in the following pages and shortly recalled in the Notes 
                                                             
8
 An assessment of the tradeoff between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality, with reference to OECD countries in 
1980-2005, is provided by Sorens (2014). 
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to Tables A1-A6 (Appendix). More generally, we are aware of limitations due to the quality of 
information on Italian territorial accounts, which especially before 1996 is often deemed not very 
reliable, also due to the national tradition of extreme centralization of the public sector. Nevertheless, 
we believe that our exercise is worthwhile and significant, considering that on one hand the previous 
literature has acknowledged the overall trustworthiness of our sources (even the oldest ones), and on 
the other hand the results we work out from our analysis are sufficiently neat to support at least 
qualitative (if not quantitative) conclusions on the dynamics of the examined variables. A further 
implication of the lack of primary data is that the time series we obtain are discontinuous, since many 
observations are only yearly averages over longer periods, while for some years data are missing. The 
nature of data, together with the small sample size makes our data not suitable for time series analysis. 
To integrate the series with the data of the last two decades, we consistently select the studies by 
Arachi et al. (2010) for the years 1996-2002, Staderini and Vadalà (2009) for the years 2004-2006 and 
Arachi et al. (2013) for the years 2007-2010, which considering the employed methodology, supply the 
most homogeneous data with those of the previous years. 
Another important methodological point concerns the exact definition of our main variable, i.e. 
the Net Fiscal Flow: what is NFF and how is it measured? It is worth mentioning that there are several 
more or less similar ways to compute NFF
9
. The definition that we and most of our source papers adopt 
considers NFF as the difference between what the residents of a region or a macro-region contribute to 
the general (central, local and social security) government and what they gain from it in terms of public 
spending targeted to that (macro-)region
10
. This approach is quite comprehensive and in principle 
meant to include all public revenues and expenditures (with the exceptions mentioned below) relevant 
to a given territory. In particular, both current and capital expenditure are taken into account, while 
conversely revenues/expenditures of public enterprises and transfers from/to all other levels of 
government are excluded. 
A common feature of previous studies on regional NFFs is the omission from computations of 
interests on public debt. This is usually motivated by the practical problems involved in the allocation 
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 The methodological problems connected to measuring NFFs are addressed for instance by the papers in Part I of Bosch et 
al. (2010); for a survey, see in particular Ruggeri (2010). 
10
 The opposite definition (i.e. public expenditure minus taxation) is also common. More generally, in federal contexts, NFF 
is alternatively calculated as the payments made by residents and regional government to other (federal or regional) 
governments minus what a region receives through direct spending and intergovernmental transfers (Ruggeri, 2010). A 
partly different approach distinguishes between vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances (e.g. Bird and Tarasov, 2004); 
Arachi et al. (2010) evaluate NFFs for Italian regions and then break them down in their vertical and horizontal 
components.  
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of interests among regions. Several authors also argue that interest payments should be kept out of 
NFFs calculation because they do not bestow additional benefits on the recipients, who would have 
otherwise purchased private securities. As pointed out by Ruggeri and Yu (2000), this argument is little 
convincing since the cost of servicing public debt is borne by taxpayers often dwelling outside the 
region where interests are paid and/or public debt accumulated because primary outlays were not 
financed by current taxes. Although the payment of interests constitutes an additional component of 
interregional redistribution (see Giannola and Scalera, 1995 for more detail on the Italian case), we will 
not include it in NFFs, given the difficulty of evaluating this item. However, some descriptive data on 
the regional distribution of interest payments on public debt are reported below to highlight its potential 
relevance in the North-South redistribution. 
An additional issue we deal with concerns the possible adjustment of regional NFFs to account 
for aggregate public surplus or deficit. In fact, when the purpose of reckoning NFFs is that of 
representing the intensity of regional redistribution operated through the public sector, it seems sensible 
to cleanse regional balances from the amount accounting for the regional share of the overall surplus or 
deficit (McCracken, 1993; Mansell and Schlenker, 1995; Ambrosanio et al., 2010; Arachi et al., 2013). 
To do that, we amend original data by allocating surplus or deficit to regions on a per capita basis, so as 
to have a zero aggregate net fiscal flow (i.e. national aggregate NFF=0 and therefore national per capita 
NFF=0). Finally, concerning the regional gains from public spending, the approach adopted by all our 
sources and ourselves is the one known as the benefit approach (for alternative approaches, see 
Ruggeri, 2010) which focuses on the actual beneficiary of spending. As it is known, this latter is not 
always residing in the region where expenditure is formally recorded, like in the case of general public 
services concentrated in Lazio, the region of the capital Rome, but actually regarding all residents 
throughout the country. 
 
3.2. Data 
The Data Appendix collects six Tables displaying the data on regional per capita public revenues and 
expenditures (yearly averages on 11 periods between 1951 and 2010) that we employ in this section 
and the following ones. The figures reported in Tables A1 to A6 are derived from original data supplied 
by the source papers after suitable manipulation. All of them are converted from Liras current values 
into constant 2010 Euros values through a national-wide GDP deflator.  
The data drawn from Tarquinio (1969) for the period 1951-1965 are definitely the most difficult 
to be made homogeneous with other information. Regional revenues are originally constituted by cash 
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inflows to Provincial Treasuries of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, i.e. taxes on personal 
income, business activities, production, consumption, customs, revenues from lotteries and public 
monopolies. Similarly, expenditures are calculated as the regional sum of the payments made by 
Provincial Treasuries of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. As revenues and expenditures 
pertaining to the Central Treasury of the Ministry of Economy and Finance are left out, we correct the 
original data by adding a proportional (to the population residing in the region) share of the overall 
amount revenues and expenditures of Central Treasury to revenues and expenditures of Provincial 
Treasuries. In addition, since Tarquinio (1969) omits capital expenditures, we proceed to a further 
adjustment by estimating the missing items. To do that, we use data from Ministero dell’Economia e 
delle Finanze (2011) and Picci (2002): we retrieve from the former (Table 22, p. 50) the shares of 
current and capital public expenditure for the years 1950 to 1970 so as to estimate the total capital 
public expenditure, and them attach to each region a share of it according to the estimated allocation of 
public investments among Italian regions in years between 1948 and 1969 (Picci, 2002, pp. 32-34). 
This procedure yields reasonably reliable estimates of total regional revenues and expenditures which 
are the basis for calculation of the per capita data reported in Table A1. 
Table A2 reports data relative to years 1971-73 originally presented in Forte et al. (1978). Tables 
A3, A4 and A5 summarize the same kind of data for years 1983-85, 1986-89 and 1990-92 retrieved 
from ISTAT (1996). Unlike Tarquinio (1969), the more refined detail of information allows in these 
cases to distinguish not only between current and capital expenditures but also to single out social 
security revenues and expenditures. As a consequence, Tables A2 to A5 show both total regional NFFs 
(total revenues minus total expenditures) and “Net of social security” regional NFFs (tax revenues 
minus the difference between total expenditures and social security payments). Table A6 collects data 
from Fondazione Agnelli (1998) for the year 1995, Arachi et al. (2010) for years 1996-2002, Staderini 
and Vadalà (2009) for 2004-2006 and Arachi et al. (2013) for 2007-2010. Since Fondazione Agnelli 
(1998) does not supply data on social security payments, these are supposed to be equal in per capita 
terms to the values of 1990-1992. In Table A6 no distinction is made between social security and other 
items for both payments and revenues, since the source papers do not supply these details. Finally, 
following Arachi et al. (2010) and Arachi et al. (2013), only data on net fiscal flows are shown for 
1996-2002 and 2007-2010. 
Data of Tables A1 to A6 are the basis to build up the series of yearly averages of regional NFFs 
in absolute Euro 2010 values reported in Table 1. These values are adjusted for aggregate budget 
surpluses or deficits (i.e. modified as explained above to make aggregate surplus/deficit equal to zero), 
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in order to highlight the inter-regional redistribution operated through the public sector, regardless the 
occurrence of aggregate primary surpluses or deficits. Table 2 shows the NFFs in absolute Euro 2010 
values for four macro-regions, and also reports both per capita and NFF/GDP ratios. 
 
<< TABLE 1 >> 
<< TABLE 2 >> 
 
3.3. Results 
To have a first glance on the outcome of our reconstruction, we can look at Table 2 and Figures 1a,b 
and 2a,b
11
 where the time paths of NFFs (in 2010 billion Euros absolute and per capita values) for the 
four macro-regions are displayed. The figures show that the evolution of NFFs over time is 
characterized by the following major features: 
a) despite the multiplicity and heterogeneity of sources, NFFs of all macro-regions follow a 
consistent and relatively smooth pattern throughout the whole period; 
b) a strong and continuous (at least until the end of the 1990s) increase in the absolute values of 
NFFs and an apparent deepening of redistribution in favor of the South takes place over time; 
c) North-West and Mezzogiorno increasingly assume opposite roles as structural donor and 
recipient, while North-East and Centre are initially neutral and turn out to appreciably contribute from 
mid-1970s onwards. More precisely, both absolute and per capita values of Mezzogiorno NFFs follow 
a U-shaped curve with the trough in the second half of the 1990s, while North-West shows a 
symmetrically opposite evolution. For the other two macro-regions the variability of NFF indicators is 
definitely lower. North-East initially exhibits NFFs close to 0 in terms of both absolute and per capita 
values while later on, between 1984 and 1999, the trend is increasing. Since 1999 the NFF of this 
macro-region again shrinks in both absolute and relative terms. Finally, for the regions of Centre, the 
NFF is negative and close to the figures of Mezzogiorno up to the beginning of the 1970s; then it turns 
to be positive and increases steadily throughout the period. Finally, in the last four years (2007-2010), 
the NFF becomes greater in Centre than North-East. 
 
<< FIGURES 1a,b – 2a,b>> 
                                                             
11
 Figures 1a and 2a show the time dynamics of actual values, while figures 1b and 2b present the Kernel-weighted local 
polynomial smoothing for each macro-region. 
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Following the most common approach in the literature, our data on NFFs do not include the 
payment of interests on public debt, as recalled before. However, it is important to bear in mind that the 
share of public bonds held by residents in Mezzogiorno has been much lower than the one belonging to 
Northern residents over the whole period 1951-2010. This obviously implies that Southern regions 
have always benefitted from lower interest payments by the State than other macro-regions, as we 
document in Table 3 (the average value of interests paid in the Centre-North is set equal to 100; only 
selected years are reported due to data availability). Augmenting NFFs with public outlays connected 
to interest payments could presumably affect the shape of curves in Figures 1a,b and 2a,b in a 
significant way thus downsizing the actual extent of interregional redistribution (Giannola and Scalera, 
1995). 
 
<< TABLE 3>> 
 
4. Mezzogiorno NFFs and regional convergence: a weak link 
The evolution of NFFs described by Figures 1a,b and 2a,b, showing a striking increase of interregional 
unbalances between the second half of the 1970s and the end of the 1990s, followed by a significant 
reduction in the last decade, raises (at least) two important points. The former concerns the possible 
link between the observed dynamics of NFFs and the Southern gap in both per capita income and other 
indicators of economic and social development. The latter regards the assessment to give of the size of 
interregional redistribution over the six decades under consideration, taking into account the disparities 
in initial economic conditions between Mezzogiorno and the rest of the country. The present section is 
devoted to discuss some aspects of the first issue, while section 5 will deal with the second topic. 
A plausible rationale for the NFFs dynamics is connected to the implementation of regional 
policies, aiming at filling the historical North-South gap, and possibly implying the transfer of large 
amounts of financial resources to Mezzogiorno
12
. Behind this conjecture there is the idea that the rise in 
North-South transfers may have served the purpose of reducing the social and economic gap of 
Mezzogiorno by financing the needed public investments; alternatively, increasing NFFs may have 
                                                             
12
 A rise in total investment expenditure in Mezzogiorno connected to the implementation of regional policies has to be 
backed by increases in one or more of the following: domestic private saving, domestic public saving and outside saving. 
This latter includes in turn public (NFFs) and private (mainly, direct investments by firms and financial flows by banks) 
components. To the extent that domestic saving falls short of total investment, transfers from outside are needed. On an 
application of national accounting methodologies to the case of Mezzogiorno unbalance, see Savona (2010).   
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been simply the other side of the coin from excess consumption in the South. The evidence of NFFs 
evolution through time, and the inspection of facts and data on the most salient points of the 
progression of the North-South gap during the considered period, cast doubt on the existence of a 
connection between interregional imbalances and the path of economic convergence/divergence among 
Italian regions. Rather, the drift observed in transfers to Mezzogiorno seems to follow the prevailing 
tendency to an escalating public expenditure, led by the inception and consolidation of regional 
governments and characterized by a substantial reduction in the share of capital to total public 
expenditure. 
To develop this point, it can be useful to look first at Figure 3, displaying the time path of 
Mezzogiorno relative per capita GDP (100 is the national average) for the period 1951-2010. By and 
large, the picture allows identifying four different phases in the process of regional 
convergence/divergence in Italy, the turning points being related to changes in the nationwide 
economic cycle and regional policies’ switches. 
 
<< FIGURE 3>> 
 
Phase 1: Convergence. From (late) 1950s to the early 1970s, a relatively long period of 
substantial regional convergence takes place. 
Phase 2: Stability. After the relative GDP reaches its maximum value in 1972-74, in the following 
decade the nationwide economic slowdown coincides with a stage of stability in regional disparities, 
with Mezzogiorno going through a progressive rundown of industrial investments and a fall in relative 
productivity. 
In these first two stages, covering years of rapid growth (the so-called Italian economic miracle) 
and a final decade of stabilization, regional policy is driven by the “Intervento Straordinario” (Special 
Aid Program) leading Mezzogiorno to start industrialization and significantly reduce its development 
gap. The policy stance is characterized by centralized (at a national level) governance and a strong 
supply-based approach, typically following a top-down pattern. The “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno” 
(Mezzogiorno National Agency) is the main responsible for both planning and funding interventions, 
focusing its action on: a) public investment in infrastructure; b) public investment in state-owned 
enterprises; and c) funding of private investment through both capital and interest subsidies. 
Phase 3: Divergence. In the decade from mid-1980s to the end of the1990s, while the Italian 
economy experiences a stage of sluggish recovery, the North-South gap deepens.  
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Phase 4: Stability (again). From the end of the 1990s onward, the North-South output gap 
remains substantially steady, thus keeping Mezzogiorno relative output at a level barely higher than in 
the 1950s. 
Between the end of 1980s and the first 1990s regional policy is at a major turning point. The 
Mezzogiorno National Agency is dismissed and the Special Aid Program abolished and replaced by 
ordinary regional policies operating for all depressed areas in the country. The new “bottom-up” 
approach, more consistent with the European Cohesion Policy framework, focuses on local systems of 
small and medium-sized firms mostly operating in traditional industries and is based on the idea that 
“endogenous” development may be triggered by active participation of local agents in the policies’ 
programs. Public support to local demand is expected to foster local supply and boost local industrial 
activities: this justifies fiscal incentives to firms, income subsidies for households and job creation 
measures in the public sector (especially Regions). However, this strategy fails due to the strong 
economic dependence of Mezzogiorno on Northern regions: higher local demand in the South, far from 
stimulating local supply, leads to increased imports from the North, thus crowding out local industrial 
activities (Del Monte and Giannola, 1997; Erbetta e Petraglia, 2011). 
To focus on the relationship between the dynamics of NFFs and a possible pattern of regional 
convergence/divergence, Table 4 considers the Relative Regional Income Indicator      
     
     
, 
where the subscripts i, t and a respectively stand for region, time and national average value. 
Calculating coefficients of linear correlation between on one side absolute and percentage changes in 
    , and on the other side regional NFFs (a) in absolute per capita terms, (b) as a ratio to regional 
GDP, and (c) as the natural logarithm of that ratio, considering both current and lagged values, we 
verify that no significant correlation emerges at the usual threshold of 5% confidence. The same 
conclusion is confirmed by an inspection of Figure 4, where percentage changes in      are contrasted 
to lagged per capita NFFs and lagged natural logarithms of NFF to GDP ratios: both the scatter plots 
(as well as the ones relative to similar comparisons, here not shown for brevity) depict a point cloud 
without any hint of a possible relationship between net fiscal flows and relative GDP growth. Although 
data are little suitable to econometric applications, we also made several attempts to detect a possible 
influence of NFFs on convergence of Italian regions. In no case we found significant effects of 
Southern regions unbalances on  and  convergence. 
 
<< TABLE 4>> 
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<< FIGURE 4>> 
 
Tables 5 to 7 focus on other specific salient aspects of the North-South gap. Table 5 reports 
indicators of aggregate productivity, accumulation and industrialization rates over the considered 
period (figures are expressed in relative terms; 100 is the national average), highlighting a pattern of 
significant improvement experienced by the Southern economy in the first phase of convergence, 
followed by a relative decline. Likewise, figures reported in Table 6 and 7 emphasize the persistence of 
the Italian dualism considering socio-economic facets of the gap. According to Table 6, the share of 
households in poverty is nowadays still significantly higher in the South than in the rest of the country. 
Disaggregated data on the Human Development Index (Felice and Vasta, 2012) reported in Table 7 
confirm that in Italy, even from the more general perspective of socio-economic development, the 
regional convergence came to a halt in the 1980s, despite the subsequent substantial increase in NFFs. 
 
<< TABLES 5-7>> 
 
From the scrutiny of the events occurred throughout the four phases of Mezzogiorno 
convergence/divergence and the examination of Figures 3-4 and Tables 4-7, the link between the 
dynamics of regional NFFs and the evolution of the North-South gap appears definitely faint. Indeed, 
for the first three phases, there is no evidence that increasing NFFs have been accompanied by a 
reduction in the gap: actually, on one side the sustained process of regional convergence of the 1950s-
1970s was achieved at the cost of moderate interregional transfers; on the other, the gap widened just in 
correspondence to larger and increasing NFFs. Finally, in the last phase (from the mid-1990s onwards), 
a stable or slightly decreasing gap has been matched by shrinking NFFs. 
While the evidence does not seem to support the hypothesis that the increase (and the subsequent 
decrease) of NFFs be somehow connected to the evolution of indicators of any kind of socio-economic 
North-South gap, other features of the evolution of Italian public expenditure may help to explain the 
deepening of Mezzogiorno imbalances and to some extent even the reasons of its scarce impact on the 
North-South gap. In particular, the institutional break connected to the establishment of “Regioni a 
Statuto Ordinario” (Regions) occurred between 1972 and 1977, and the substantial reduction in the 
share of capital to total public expenditure taking place over the entire considered span of time and 
especially since the early 1980s seem to play a significant role. 
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The decentralization of expenditure responsibilities at a regional level can be sensibly regarded as 
one of the main determinants of the structural changes occurred in public expenditure in these years, 
and a likely major reason of the rise in NFFs. By mid-1970s, an overhaul of local government 
financing system takes place, through a strong decentralization of expenditure (due to the attribution of 
health, transportation and other expenditures to Regions) and a contemporary centralization of revenues 
from municipalities to the national government. The two main consequences of this break are a 
noteworthy rise in the local governments’ share on total primary current expenditure and above all a 
massive expansion of overall public expenditure. Starting from this latter, Giarda (2011, Table 1, p. 6) 
documents that the primary expenditure of public administration (central and local governments) was 
about 22% of GDP in 1951, 32% in 1970, 43% in 1990 and 47% in 2010. Compared to the doubling of 
the national expenditure/GDP ratio, the growth of Mezzogiorno NFF, rising from 10-13% of local GDP 
in the 1950s-1960s to 22% in the 1990s, seems no longer enormous, while its roots appear to be 
somehow connected to the overall drift of public expenditure. Secondly, according to Giarda (2011), 
the local governments’ share of public primary expenditure rose from 19% (1951) to 25% (1980) and 
further to 32% in 2008. At the same time, between 1951 and 1980, the local governments’ share of own 
taxes on total revenues shifted from 63% to 10%, to recover to 40% only much later in 2009, after the 
season of fiscal federalism which drove back to local governments a larger share of public revenues. 
The “decentralization without accountability” formula adopted by the Italian legislator in the 1970s 
may have fostered a condition of soft budget constraint that the literature has proved to be highly 
detrimental for fiscal discipline (Rodden et al., 2003). This can be considered an important source of 
the large fiscal deficits of local governments, escalating deficits by the overall public sector and heavy 
imbalances of Southern regions occurred in the following decades
13
. 
The other salient feature of the Italian public expenditure evolution over the considered decades 
is the shrink of the capital component. Looking again at Giarda (2011), we learn that between 1951 and 
2010 the current primary expenditure of public administration increased from 81% (1951) to 84% 
(2010) of total expenditure and interest payments rose from 4% to 9%. On the other hand, capital 
expenditures were progressively reduced from 15.4% (1951) to 10.8% (1980) and 6.8% (2010), with 
the local governments’ share rising from 20% to 59% and then 61%. Since the capital component of 
public expenditure is obviously the most relevant to development and regional policies, its reduction, 
                                                             
13
 This statement is based on the well known common pool argument, which has been applied to a local/central government 
framework by several authors. See for example Weingast et al. (1981), Velasco (2000), Pisauro (2001) and Rodden (2006). 
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and the simultaneous decentralization at a sub-national level may help rationalize the evidence of a not 
substantial effect of NFFs on the North-South gap. In this vein, Tables 8 and 9 provide some suggestive 
information on the amount of resources allotted to Mezzogiorno by regional policies from 1951 to 
2008. Table 8 shows that the financial effort of regional policies has increased up to mid-1970s and 
decreased afterwards, depicting a path much more similar to the evolution of the gap than the dynamics 
of Mezzogiorno NFF. In percentage of national GDP, resources deployed for public intervention in 
Mezzogiorno increased from 0.73% in 1951 to 1.32% in 1980. The decreasing trend experienced in the 
following years occurred in correspondence with: the progressive decline of the activities of “Cassa per 
il Mezzogiorno” in the 1981-1986 period (1.19%), the ending of extraordinary intervention in 1987-
1993 (1.10%), and the beginning of the so called ordinary intervention for depressed areas in 1994-
1998 (0.74%). By distinguishing between “public investment and business incentives” and “payroll tax 
reductions”, Table 8 emphasizes the switch occurred in regional policies from supply side interventions 
to demand-targeted measures aimed at stimulating the Mezzogiorno economy by means of fiscal 
subsidies to firms and income support for households (as well as job creation measures in the public 
sector). Such a change, mirrored in the increase of public resources assigned to payroll tax reductions 
observed since the early 1970s contributed to make financial transfers less effective in reducing the 
Southern gap. Likewise, Table 9 shows that even in the last years, a substantial decline in capital public 
expenditure in Mezzogiorno has taken place, with business incentives falling from about 50% of total 
expenditure in 2001 to around 35% in 2008 and public investment decreasing below 35%. 
 
<<TABLES 8-9>> 
 
Finally, concerning the effects of the choice to decentralize capital expenditures, Scalera and 
Zazzaro (2010) point out the possible failures involved by poor skills of local bureaucracies, while 
Mauro and Pigliaru (2013) argue that the effectiveness of public investments is related to the local 
endowment of social capital: if this latter is lower than the national average level (as it happens in 
Mezzogiorno), a project managed by central government institutions is more productive and conducive 
to growth than one managed by local institutions. This result is in line with the empirical evidence on 
the role of government quality in shaping the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional 
disparities. In principle, fiscal decentralization has the potential to reduce income differences across 
regions but this potential may not produce actual results due to governance problems associated with 
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sub-national authorities. In particular, fiscal decentralization will promote regional convergence only in 
high government quality settings, while it will magnify regional disparities in contexts with poor 
governance (Kyriacou et al., 2013). 
Summarizing, the prominent upsurge of NFFs in 1980s and 1990s seems to have exerted a 
negligible impact on the North-South gap because it has not been connected to a stronger commitment 
in supply-side regional and development policies with the needed rise of capital expenditure in 
Mezzogiorno. Rather, the increase of NFFs seems due mainly to a generalized escalation in the overall 
primary expenditure probably related to the “decentralization without accountability” design of the 
fiscal reforms of 1970s, privileging current over capital expenditure.  
 
5. An assessment of interregional redistribution. Too much money to Mezzogiorno? 
In the last two section, we saw that over the considered six decades the size of NFFs has remarkably 
increased while, especially after mid-1970s, the effects on the growth of Mezzogiorno have been fairly 
small, probably because the features of the escalation in public expenditures have been little functional 
to the purposes of regional policies. The evidence of relatively worthless transfers might supply the 
underpinning for a radical critique against interregional unbalances: given that NFFs have shown to be 
little useful to closing the gap, why not reducing them substantially? In what follows, we seek to give a 
general assessment of the size of interregional redistribution based upon indexes and analytical 
procedures intensively used in the literature. Our basic idea is that the judgment on the adequateness of 
redistribution has to be driven by the consideration of actual inequalities, in the face of the public 
commitment to reduce regional disparities and the constitutional principles of equal access to the basic 
public services, taking also in account comparisons with the extent of interregional redistribution 
occurring in other countries. We dispute that the evidence of a scarce actual impact of redistribution on 
the North-South gap be in itself a good argument to call for a drastic cut in transfers, and believe that 
past failures should rather stimulate the search for more effective policies for rebalancing geographical 
disparities than be used as an excuse for egoistic localism. 
Figure 5 displays the relationship between regional per capita NFFs and per capita GDP between 
1951 and 2010. The dataset we employ is the same as in section 3. The four graphs refer to different 
time intervals, i.e. the whole period 1951-2010 in the top left, and the three sub-periods 1951-90 (top 
right), 1984-2010 (bottom left) and 1991-2010 (bottom right). As shown in the top panels, the link 
between regional income and fiscal balances turns out to be fairly weak on the whole and particularly 
for the first four decades. R
2
 values are low for the whole sample regression and for the years 1951 to 
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1990. For this latter period the regression coefficient is not significantly positive. This evidence is 
partially contrasted in the bottom panels, indicating a stronger relationship for the last two decades. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, more affluent regions start recording significant increases in NFFs: 
according to regressions’ coefficients, on average, an additional per capita euro involves a rise of about 
35-40 cents in per capita NFFs. 
 
<< FIGURE 5>> 
 
The descriptive evidence just described is made more significant by estimating the Bayoumi and 
Masson (1995) and Bosch et al. (2002) equations on the same data. Bayoumi and Masson (1995) 
estimate the size of territorial redistribution by studying the relationship between regional disposable 
income after public revenues and expenditures have taken place (i.e.   
           ) and initial 
regional income     . Dividing these variables by average values to normalize, and taking logarithms 
we get the equation to estimate: 
           
   
 
   
         
     
     
              (1) 
where the subscripts have the same meaning as in section 4. The estimated value for β can be used to 
account for the redistributive impact of public finance. As a matter of fact, if an increase of 1% in 
    
    
 
involves a corresponding increase of 1% in 
  
 
  
  , then the redistributive impact is zero, whereas when the 
increase of 
  
 
  
  is only 0.7%, then redistribution can assessed at 30%. Therefore (1-β) represents the size 
of redistribution brought about by interregional fiscal flows.  
A complementary way to accomplish the task of assessing the redistributive impact of fiscal 
flows is the estimation of the Bosch et al. (2002) equation: 
        (  
     
     
)        
     
     
             (2) 
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where γ (the income elasticity of NFFs) is again a measure of the intensity of redistribution. In the 
presence of a redistributive function for NFFs, we expect that  ̂ takes negative values: the higher its 
absolute value, the stronger impact of fiscal flows
14
. 
Table 10 summarizes the results of estimation of the two equations (the first six columns refer to 
equation 1; the last six columns to equation 2) for both the whole period 1951-2010 and the sub-period 
1984-2010, during which the extent of NFFs has become more significant. Over the entire span of time 
1951-2010, the extent of redistribution turns out to range from 8% (fixed effects estimates) to 35% 
(OLS estimates). Since, according to the Hausman test reported in the eighth row of the Table, FE 
should be preferred to the other two kind of estimations, we can conclude that over the whole period 
1951-2010 the redistributive impact of public financial flows can be deemed rather weak. On the other 
hand, the picture is somewhat different when only the last 25 years are taken into consideration, since 
now redistribution looks more substantial in any of the three estimations presented. In particular, in the 
case of random effects estimates, i.e. the ones more appropriate according to the Hausman and Breusch 
and Pagan tests, the redistributive impact of public financial flows is estimated around 44%. 
 
<< TABLE 10>> 
 
Although comparisons with other studies and other countries require the due circumspection, 
weighing this result against most of the existing literature confirms that the intensity of interregional 
redistribution in Italy can be judged relatively limited. The size of redistribution through public fiscal 
flows is around 40% (average over several countries) for MacDougall (1977); 30% for Spain in 
Castells et al. (1981); 39% for Canada and 22% for the United States according to Bayoumi and 
Masson (1995); 38% in France, 26% in UK, 18% in Canada and 16% in the USA in Mélitz and 
Zummer (1998); 40% for Germany in Duboz and Nicot (1998); 45% on average in several European 
countries, for Castells (1998). More recently, Barberán et al. (2000), estimating equation (1) for Spain 
in 1991-96, evaluate between 32% and 38% the redistributive power of the activity of the Spanish 
central public administration. Bosch et al. (2002) evaluates redistribution as follows: 28% for Australia 
in 1985-1999, 33% for Spain in 1991-1996, 18% for the United States in 1981-1998 and 5% for the 
                                                             
14
 Bosch et al. (2002) show that there is a precise relationship between   of equation (1) and   of equation (2), i.e. the 
redistributive power       is equal to  . 
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European Union in 1986-1999
15
. Rodden (2010) estimates the redistributive power of public grants 
between 1990 and 2005 as follows: less than 10% in Argentina, Brasil, India, United States and 
European Union; between 10% and 20% in Australia, Germany and Spain; around 23% in Canada. 
Finally, Decressin (2002) and Arachi et al. (2010) use similar estimates to assess the extent of 
redistribution in Italy respectively in the periods 1983-1992 and 1996-2002; the former find that the 
redistributive power of fiscal flows is around 24% while for the latter the estimate is about 28%
16
. 
Another aggregated index of redistribution we consider is the Pechman and Okner (1980) index 
    
        
    
, measuring the proportional change in the Gini index G due to public expenditure and 
taxation. Assuming that the public sector activity does not increase income concentration, i.e.      
   , given the properties of the Gini index, it follows        , with redistribution intensity 
increasing in    . Figure 6, depicting the time path of the Pechman and Okner index for all regions and 
the four macro-regions alone, confirms that redistribution intensity follows the dynamics of NFFs, first 
increasing and then decreasing over time. Notably, the overall impact on concentration turns out to be 
stronger across all regions than the macroregions alone, a hint that not negligible redistribution occurs 
within the set of Northern and Central regions as well. 
An additional important piece of information concerns the actual burden imposed by 
redistribution to residents of contributing regions. To investigate this issue Figures 7a,b are drawn, 
showing the ratios of NFFs over regional GDPs in the four macro-regions. While not surprisingly 
North-West turns out to be the macro-region with the most significant contribution to interregional 
transfers relative to its own GDP, its role in nourishing the redistribution toward Mezzogiorno appears 
to be significantly declining over time. As a matter of fact, from 1980s onward (and particularly in 
2007-10) the weighted-by-GDP contribution of North-West to transferring resources to the South 
comes out to be less than in 1950s-1960s. Concerning North-East, the weight of NFF on its own GDP 
                                                             
15
 “However, if we consider that the relative size of the European Union budget in terms of GDP is quite small…, the 
redistributive power is in fact very high” (Espasa, 2001, page 31). 
16
 Looking at comparisons of per capita regional or macro-regional NFFs across countries, the case of Northern Ireland is 
particularly striking: according to recent estimates (N.I. Department of Finance and Personnel, 2014), in 2011-12 its per 
head NFF was about 6700 Euros, i.e. 4000 Euros net of UK aggregate per capita deficit (in 2009-10 the same figures were 
respectively 7500 and 4500 Euros). Wales and North-East England show smaller but still significant and long-lasting 
unbalances (Economic Outlook, 2008; Eden, 2011). In Germany, some Länder display large per capita differences between 
received and disbursed payments (considering both horizontal LFA and vertical BEZ transfers, see Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2011). Throughout the period 1995-2010 this aggregate, similar to NFF, amounts to about 1800 Euros and 1600 
Euros per year respectively for Bremen and Berlin. These comparisons, even if require even more caution than the ones on 
the redistributive power of public finance, highlight that the figures of Mezzogiorno unbalance do not look 
disproportionately large with respect to other European territories. 
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remains always rather low, within 6%, even in the 1980s and 1990s when absolute and per capita 
transfers significantly increase. Concerning Centre, from 1972 onward its NFF/GDP ratio is always 
very close to North-East and at the end of the period it is about 5.13%, not much lower than the value 
of North-West (7.43%). 
 
<< FIGURES 6-7>> 
 
Finally, a judgment about the magnitude of interregional redistribution cannot fail to consider: on 
one side the constraints that constitutional principles of citizens’ equality impose to governments to 
guarantee an amount and a quality of public goods pretty uniform across regions, even in the presence 
of significant differences in the regional ability to self-finance those public goods; on the other, the 
obvious link that a progressive taxation system establishes between differences in regional GDPs and 
differences in regional fiscal revenues. To take into account these aspects, we set up Figure 8 and 9. 
Figure 8 shows the relative values of per capita public expenditures in the four macro-regions between 
1971 and 2006. The graph points out that while in the 1970s per capita public expenditure is higher in 
Mezzogiorno than in all the other macro-regions, from the beginning of the 1980s, it is steadily below 
the national average, with the difference increasing over time (in 2004-06, more than 5% with respect 
to Italy and about 8% with respect to the North). Conversely, per capita public expenditure in North-
West and North-East is almost always above the national average, whereas in the Centre it is increasing 
throughout the period: lower than in all the other macro-regions until the end of the 1990s but higher in 
2004-06. 
Figure 9 illustrates the time path of the ratio actual/normal per capita tax revenues, where 
“normal” per capita tax revenues are calculated as the personal income tax (IRPEF) payment owed on 
an income equal to average regional GDP. In order to reckon the macro-region normal tax revenues, we 
assume that the taxpayer is a household with two children and both parents employed, with income 
equal to the average macro-region income. Then, by making use of the procedure implemented at the 
website http://www.dossier.net/irpef/calcolo-irpef.htm, we calculate her tax bill. Tax rates and family 
tax credits refer to fiscal year 2012. For example, the taxpayer North-West 1971-73 has a taxable 
yearly income of 16,891 Euros, a tax credit of 677 Euros and a theoretical tax bill of 3,284 Euros. The 
ratios actual/normal per capita tax revenues so obtained are finally normalized by setting the value of 
the ratio for Italy equal to 1. The inter-regional comparison shown in Figure 9 points out that (except in 
the 1970s) the ratio is always well above the national average in macro-region South (at least 5% 
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higher from the 1990s onward). In North-West and Centre the ratio is steadily close or just above the 
average (around 4% higher in North-West), while in North-East it is permanently lower (more than 
15% lower from 1995 onward). This evidence confirms that while in absolute terms per capita values 
of tax revenues in Mezzogiorno are always significantly lower than in the other macro-regions, due to 
the lower income of this area, the Southern citizens end up with paying considerably more than they 
would if overall fiscal revenues were shaped by the same progressivity involved by IRPEF personal 
income tax. 
Summarizing, we believe that the evidence supplies little ground for extreme judgments on the 
extent of interregional redistribution. While in fact in absolute terms the amount of transferred 
resources is significant and strongly increasing over time (at least up to the end of the 1990s), many 
indicators show that the impact of redistribution can be deemed to be moderate considering the severity 
of regional income differences and the reasonable burden imposed to contributing regions. 
 
<< FIGURES 8-9>> 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper carries out a long-run reconstruction of the pattern of interregional redistribution in Italy. In 
particular, by resorting to different sources, a discontinuous time series of NFFs for Italian regions and 
macro-regions from 1951 to 2010 is built up. The evidence collected is the basis to put forward on one 
side an interpretation of the dynamics of NFFs and the North-South gap and on the other an assessment 
on intensity and adequacy of redistribution in the light of actual regional inequalities and the 
constitutional principles of citizens’ equality. 
Both the analysis of data and the inspection of facts indicate that the relationship between 
interregional redistribution and regional convergence is definitely weak. This supports the view that 
redistribution through increasing NFFs has little served the purpose of regional catching up: the 
sustained process of regional convergence of the 1950s-1960s has been achieved at the cost of modest 
interregional transfers, while the North-South gap has widened just in correspondence to larger NFFs in 
the 1980s and 1990s. We have discussed possible determinants of this unfavorable outcome (i.e. 
increasing NFFs and lack of convergence): the escalation of overall public expenditure connected to the 
expenditure decentralization occurred in the 1970s with the creation of “Regioni”, the change in the 
composition of public expenditure (more current and less capital expenditure), the decentralization of 
capital expenditure responsibilities. On the role of these factors as well as on the weight of design flaws 
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of regional policies implemented in the last couple of decades in impairing the ability of redistribution 
to activate a virtuous process of convergence among Italian regions, more careful quantitative 
investigation is needed and we leave it for future research. 
Finally, we have applied a number of indicators to our newly constructed dataset in order to 
assess the intensity of redistribution in favor of Mezzogiorno, and its adequacy, taking into account the 
differences in interregional GDPs which justify public intervention. Our main conclusion is that 
Mezzogiorno has benefited from large and increasing levels of transfers of public resources, but 
nevertheless the intensity of redistribution can hardly be judged excessive. 
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Table 1. Regional net fiscal flows in Italy, average values, 1951-2010, billions of 2010 Euros.   
Regions 1951-57 1958-61 1962-65 1971-73 1983-85 1986-89 1990-92 1995 1996-02 2004-06 2007-10 
Piedmont 2.050 2.062 3.555 5.957 5.321 7.433 8.127 7.509 6.719 4.409 6.292 
Aosta Valley 0.000 -0.019 -0.032 -0.009 -0.331 -0.358 -0.274 -0.522 -0.624 -0.560 -0.087 
Lombardy 8.341 10.699 12.751 16.964 27.242 31.307 35.609 42.145 45.235 43.550 24.222 
Trentino A. A. -0.204 -0.082 -0.154 0.016 -1.591 -0.950 -1.434 -3.013 -1.669 -1.901 -1.128 
Veneto 0.593 0.063 0.066 0.716 5.244 5.622 7.398 12.986 11.149 9.054 3.585 
Friuli V. G. -0.137 -0.042 0.272 -0.669 -0.479 -0.655 0.012 -1.373 -0.143 -0.474 0.869 
Liguria 2.837 3.243 3.646 1.510 -0.793 -0.798 -0.870 -3.178 -2.117 -2.460 2.714 
Emilia Romagna 0.826 1.478 0.598 1.092 4.555 5.078 6.130 9.758 11.493 9.551 8.610 
Tuscany 0.301 -0.167 0.000 -0.164 2.639 1.438 1.411 1.142 0.973 2.595 2.491 
Umbria -0.233 -0.416 -0.492 -0.719 -0.955 -1.188 -1.286 -1.868 -1.663 -1.905 0.029 
Marche -0.066 -0.203 -0.028 -0.653 -0.479 -0.734 -0.624 -0.326 -0.514 -0.168 -0.552 
Lazio -7.150 -2.929 -7.666 3.092 4.542 8.456 8.283 11.045 9.225 11.861 13.604 
Abruzzi -0.423 -0.871 -0.764 -1.956 -3.044 -2.310 -2.236 -2.659 -2.520 -2.191 -1.600 
Molise - - - -0.681 -1.101 -1.069 -1.156 -1.348 -1.331 -1.342 -0.639 
Campania -1.053 -2.542 -2.195 -4.332 -10.043 -13.377 -13.996 -16.060 -19.574 -16.715 -18.345 
Apulia -1.135 -2.405 -1.990 -5.547 -6.385 -6.938 -7.854 -10.802 -12.625 -11.412 -9.737 
Basilicata -0.302 -0.540 -0.500 -1.432 -2.657 -2.683 -2.665 -2.391 -2.796 -2.663 -1.735 
Calabria -0.821 -1.351 -1.304 -3.722 -5.969 -7.080 -8.223 -11.835 -10.786 -9.231 -6.988 
Sicily -2.432 -4.096 -3.957 -6.413 -11.169 -15.167 -17.312 -22.691 -22.979 -17.684 -17.221 
Sardinia -0.822 -1.667 -1.858 -3.042 -3.880 -4.016 -4.494 -6.531 -6.994 -5.696 -4.384 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli (1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà 
(2009) and Arachi et al. (2013).  
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Table 2. Macro-regions’ net fiscal flows in Italy, averages, 1951-2010. 
 
1951-57 1958-61 1962-65 1971-73 1983-85 1986-89 1990-92 1995 1996-02 2004-06 2007-10 
Billions of Euros 
(2010 prices) 
North-West 13.227 15.986 19.921 24.421 31.439 37.584 42.591 45.955 49.213 44.940 33.141 
North-East 1.079 1.417 0.782 1.156 7.729 9.095 12.106 18.357 20.830 16.229 11.936 
Centre -7.148 -3.715 -8.185 1.557 5.747 7.972 7.784 9.993 8.020 12.384 15.572 
Mezzogiorno -6.989 -13.470 -12.566 -27.125 -44.249 -52.640 -57.936 -74.316 -79.605 -73.797 -60.649 
Per capita Euros 
(2010 prices) 
North-West 1,096 1,248 1,466 1,625 2,070 2,484 2,850 3,066 3,263 2,918 2,152 
North-East 114 149 81 114 742 875 1,167 1,756 1,967 1,474 1,084 
Centre -805 -402 -848 150 527 728 714 909 724 1,103 1,387 
Mezzogiorno -387 -729 -669 -1,424 -2,150 -2,515 -2,821 -3,561 -3,811 -3,561 -2,927 
Ratios to regional 
GDP 
North-West 12.97 10.78 11.19 9.62 9.23 10.12 10.37 10.92 11.10 9.57 7.43 
North-East 1.72 1.63 0.71 0.74 3.31 3.63 4.32 5.92 6.30 4.58 3.56 
Centre -12.65 -4.77 -8.16 1.05 2.66 3.38 3.03 3.58 2.68 3.87 5.13 
Mezzogiorno -9.65 -13.13 -9.70 -14.00 -15.45 -16.94 -17.65 -22.26 -22.16 -19.70 -16.98 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli (1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) 
and Arachi et al. (2013).  
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Table 3. Per capita interest payments on public debt in Mezzogiorno (Centre-North = 100) 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
20.0 25.6 28.1 28.1 29.7 30.0 30.8 30.9 31.1 29.8 29.0 29.1 29.0 
                          
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
19.1 19.3 20.2 19.6 18.2 18.5 17.0 20.0 18.3 18.5 18.1 17.0 14.5 
                          
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992       
14.5 15.4 23.3 24.3 23.8 24.7 28.1 23.6 20.9 18.6       
                          
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012       
33.5 27.9 34.3 34.8 33.9 32.9 29.6 31.1 32.4 31.8       
Sources: For the years 1951-1963 total expenditure for interest payments has been attributed to the two macro-regions according to the distribution of the 
stock of public debt owned by residents (Manfrellotti, 2008). For the 1970-1992 period: Magnani (1997). For the 2003-2012 period total expenditure has 
been attributed to the two macro-regions according to the distribution of the stock of public debt owned by residents. In 1951-62 and 2003-2012 periods, 
residents include financial institutions and households. In 2003-2012 residents are solely households.  
 
 
Table 4. NFFs and the North-South gap. Coefficients of linear correlation 
 -NFF -NFF_1 
(  
     
     
) (  
     
     
)_1   (  
     
     
)   (  
     
     
)_1 
 
     
     
 
0.0538 
(.2246) 
0.0649 
(.1806) 
0.0962* 
(.0877) 
0.0922* 
(.0971) 
0.1035* 
(.0724) 
0.1017* 
(.0759) 
   
     
     
 
0.0414 
(.2803) 
0.0420 
(.2774) 
0.0792 
(.1325) 
0.0716 
(.1568) 
0.0859 
(.1132) 
0.0791 
(.1328) 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli (1998), Arachi 
et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et al. (2013).  
Note: In parentheses p-levels; one asterisk (*) stands for significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5. Productivity, accumulation rate and 
industrialization rate in the Mezzogiorno (Italy = 100) 
Years Productivity Accumulation Rate Industrialization Rate 
1951 64.2 120.0 48.7 
1961 65.7 156.4 45.0 
1971 93.7 219.6 49.6 
1981 89.7 145.1 50.1 
1991 88.5 170.6 49.6 
2001 85.8 133.1 50.4 
2009 83.9 128.4 51.2 
Source: SVIMEZ (2011). 
Notes: Productivity = value added (Euros) / units of labor x 1000; 
Accumulation rate (%): gross physical investment / value added; 
industrialization rate (‰): units of labor employed in the 
manufacturing sector / Population. 
 
Table 6. Households in poverty (% of total population) 
 1931 1967 1971 1978 1981 1991 2008 
Italy 29.7 17.9 20.1 7.2 4.5 3.4 4.4 
Centre-North 26.9 12.5 14.4 4.2 3.2 1.5 2.2 
Mezzogiorno 35.0 32.8 32.8 12.7 8.7 7.3 9.2 
Source: Vecchi (2011). 
 
 
Table 7. Human Development Index 
 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007 
Italy 0.631 0.709 0.778 0.817 0.850 0.883 0.899 
Centre-North 0.659 0.726 0.792 0.828 0.860 0.894 0.909 
Mezzogiorno 0.574 0.671 0.749 0.794 0.831 0.862 0.877 
Mezzogiorno/Centre-North 0.87 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 
Source: Felice and Vasta (2012). 
Note: The synthetic HDI index, varying between 0 and 1, is constructed so as to capture three 
variables salient to human life quality (i.e. longevity, knowledge and income).  
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Table 8. Financial resources devoted to regional policies in Italy 1951-1998 
Years 
Public investment and business 
incentives (a) 
Payroll tax reductions (b) Total 
in 2008 
million Euros 
as % 
of Italian GDP 
in 2008 
million Euros 
as % 
of Italian GDP 
in 2008 
million Euros 
as % 
of Italian GDP 
1951-1957 1,519 0.73 - - 1,519 0.73 
1958-1965 2,321 0.74 - - 2,321 0.74 
1966-1970 2,329 0.74 361 0.13 3,607 0.80 
1971-1975 5,808 0.90 1,969 0.33 7,777 1.27 
1976-1980 7,119 0.90 3,643 0.46 10,762 1.32 
1981-1986 5,974 0.65 5,089 0.55 11,063 1.19 
1987-1993 6,305 0.57 6,215 0.55 12,521 1.10 
1994-1998 6,081 0.49 3,331 0.26 9,412 0.74 
Source: Bianchi et al. (2012). 
Notes: From 1951 to 1993: total expenditure for Intervento Straordinario in the Southern regions by Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Agenzia per il 
Mezzogiorno plus total payments by central government for other programs. Data include expenditure for: general infrastructures, sector-specific 
infrastructures, support to private investment in the form of both capital and interest subsidies and funding of “Contratti d i programma”. From 1994 to 
1998: total payments by central government for intervention in all depressed areas of the country (data do not include programs financed by European 
funds); (b) introduced from 1968 onward. 
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Table 9. Capital public expenditure in Mezzogiorno (% of 
total capital public expenditure, 2001- 2008) 
Years Public Investment Business incentives Total 
2001 35.4 49.9 41.1 
2002 32.6 48.7 39.3 
2003 30.6 48.1 37.5 
2004 30.7 47.5 36.6 
2005 32.3 45.0 36.9 
2006 32.9 43.2 36.8 
2007 34.0 37.7 35.4 
2008 34.6 35.2 34.8 
Source: Bianchi et al. (2012). 
 
 
Table 10. Redistributive power and income elasticity of NFFs. 
 1951-2010 1984-2010 1951-2010 1984-2010 
 OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
 ̂ 
0.642275*** 
(0.038565) 
0.670624*** 
(0.022680) 
0.918975*** 
(0.075670) 
0.544188*** 
(0.010742) 
0.555833*** 
(0.025939) 
0.615150*** 
(0.084091) 
      
 ̂       
-0.35772*** 
(0.038565) 
-0.32938*** 
(0.022680) 
-0.081025 
(0.075670) 
-0.45581*** 
(0.010742) 
-0.44417*** 
(0.025939) 
-0.38485*** 
(0.084091) 
Constant 
0.011474*** 
(0.001697) 
0.013784** 
(0.006490) 
0.034021*** 
(0.007220) 
0.011554*** 
(0.002152) 
0.012462* 
(0.007306) 
0.017092** 
(0.007179) 
0.011474*** 
(0.001697) 
0.013784** 
(0.006490) 
0.034021*** 
(0.007220) 
0.011554*** 
(0.002152) 
0.012462* 
(0.007306) 
0.017092** 
(0.007179) 
Adjusted    0.903051  0.925765 0.931122  0.973612 0.742691  0.802974 0.904598  0.963451 
F 2040.924***  137.554*** 1132.175***  257.428*** 633.1176***  45.6265*** 1318.995***  184.2043*** 
Hausman  22.767***  1.154  22.767***  1.154 
Breusch - 
Pagan 
 21.285***  156.422*** 
 
21.285***  156.422*** 
Observations 220 220 220 140 140 140 220 220 220 140 140 140 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli (1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and 
Arachi et al. (2013).  
Note: (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance respectively at confidence levels of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%.   
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Figure 1a. Macro-regions’ NFFs (2010 billion Euros), 1951-2010. 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli 
(1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et al. (2013).  
 
Figure 1b. Macro-regions’ NFFs (2010 billion Euros), 1951-2010, Kernel Smoothing 
 
Note: Graphs are obtained by using Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing for each macro-region 
separately.  
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Figure 2a. Macro-regions’ per capita NFFs (2010 Euros), 1951-2010. 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli 
(1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et al. (2013). 
 
Figure 2b. Macro-regions’ per capita NFFs (2010 Euros), 1951-2010, Kernel Smoothing 
 
 Note: Graphs are obtained by using Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing for each macro-region 
separately.
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Figure 3. Mezzogiorno per capita GDP (Italy = 100), 1951-2010. 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Vecchi (2011) 
 
Figure 4. NFFs and the North-South gap. Scatter plots. 
 
Note: d_ln_RRII = % change in RRII; NFF_1 = one period lagged values of NFF; ln_NFF_GDP_1 = one 
period lagged values of NFF to GDP ratio. 
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Figure 5. Regional relative per capita Net Fiscal Flows 1951-2010 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli (1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et 
al. (2013). 
Note: y = per capita NFFs; x = per capita GDP.  
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Figure 6. The Pechman and Okner index of redistribution, 1951-2010. 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli 
(1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et al. (2013). 
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Figure 7a. Macro-regions’ ratios NFF/GDP (%), 1951-2010. 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione Agnelli 
(1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et al. (2013).  
 
 
Figure 7b. Macro-regions’ ratios NFF/GDP (%), 1951-2010, Kernel Smoothing 
 
Note: Graphs are obtained by using Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing for each macro-
region separately.  
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Figure 8. Macro-regions’ per capita public expenditures, 1971-2006 (Italy = 1). 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione 
Agnelli (1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et al. (2013).  
 
Figure 9. Macro-regions’ actual/normal per capita revenues, 1971-2006 (Italy = 1). 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969), Forte et al. (1978), ISTAT (1996), Fondazione 
Agnelli (1998), Arachi et al. (2010), Staderini and Vadalà (2009) and Arachi et al. (2013).  
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Table A1. Regional public revenues, expenditures and net fiscal flows in Italy, 1951-1965, yearly averages, per capita values in 2010 Euros. 
Regions 1951-1957 1958-1961 1962-1965 
 Revenues Expenditures NFFs Revenues Expenditures NFFs Revenues Expenditures NFFs 
Piedmont 1297 1407 -110 1861 2001 -140 2528 2150 379 
Aosta Valley 591 3000 -2410 641 3633 -2993 909 2763 -1853 
Lombardy 1599 1236 363 2176 1767 408 2784 1752 1033 
Trentino A. A. 706 1788 -1082 852 2029 -1177 1121 2138 -1017 
Veneto 982 1597 -615 1307 2010 -703 1473 2049 -576 
Friuli V. G. 331 1078 -747 913 1888 -974 1695 2110 -415 
Liguria 2605 2264 341 3199 2763 436 3810 2881 929 
Emilia Romagna 867 1741 -874 1200 2107 -907 1521 2043 -522 
Tuscany 877 1710 -833 1140 2236 -1096 1416 2091 -675 
Umbria 260 1178 -918 330 1554 -1225 435 1767 -1332 
Marche 499 1682 -1183 685 1769 -1084 980 1662 -681 
Lazio 2325 5160 -2835 3555 5379 -1824 3843 6283 -2439 
Abruzzi-Molise 281 1614 -1333 363 2157 -1793 479 1759 -1280 
Campania 615 1690 -1075 784 2149 -1364 1006 2023 -1017 
Apulia 435 1450 -1015 508 1782 -1274 656 1717 -1061 
Basilicata 115 2091 -1976 145 2825 -2681 187 2254 -2067 
Calabria 186 1200 -1013 258 2192 -1934 312 2025 -1712 
Sicily 231 1586 -1355 305 2156 -1850 377 1718 -1340 
Sardinia 257 2477 -2220 322 3214 -2892 409 2497 -2087 
Source: Own elaboration on Tarquinio (1969).  
Notes: Original data (in current Liras values) were first transformed in current euro values and then converted in constant 2010 Euros using a national-wide 
GDP deflator. Regional revenues are constituted by cash inflows to Provincial Treasuries of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, i.e. taxes on personal 
income, business activities, production, consumption and customs; revenues from lotteries and public monopolies. Expenditures are calculated as the 
regional sum of the payments made by Provincial Treasuries of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Data are also adjusted to take into account the 
payments settled by the Central Treasury of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and capital expenditures (for details, see the main text). 
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Table A2. Regional public revenues, expenditures and net fiscal flows in Italy, 1971-1973, yearly averages, per capita values in 2010 Euros. 
Regions 
Revenues Expenditures NFFs 
Tax 
revenues 
(1) 
Social security 
Contributions 
Total 
(2) 
Social 
Security 
payments 
Exp. for 
collective goods 
(3) 
Capital 
Exp. 
(4) 
Total 
(5) 
Total 
(2) – (5) 
Net of Social 
Security 
(1) – (3) – (4) 
Piedmont 2898 2064 4962 2286 828 549 3658 1303 1521 
Aosta Valley 2748 2052 4800 2230 1235 1452 4918 -118 61 
Lombardy 3109 2208 5317 2099 733 548 3381 1935 1828 
TrentinoAlto Adige 2086 1512 3598 1609 1481 523 3614 -16 82 
Veneto 2008 1399 3407 1800 983 487 3270 137 538 
FriuliVenezia Giulia 2234 1703 3937 2321 1695 505 4520 -583 34 
Liguria 3010 1980 4990 2443 1227 540 4211 779 1243 
Emilia Romagna 2450 1614 4064 2294 946 577 3817 247 927 
Tuscany 2340 1471 3811 2214 1140 539 3893 -82 661 
Umbria 1867 1268 3136 2320 1068 703 4091 -955 96 
Marche 1851 1131 2982 1825 1057 612 3495 -512 182 
Lazio 3027 1652 4679 1809 1645 608 4062 617 774 
Abruzzo 1438 816 2254 1736 1090 1129 3954 -1700 -781 
Molise 1135 668 1803 1860 1162 936 3959 -2156 -963 
Campania 1408 926 2334 1585 963 667 3215 -881 -222 
Apulia 1311 944 2256 1649 1171 1001 3822 -1566 -861 
Basilicata 1189 773 1962 1692 1065 1607 4364 -2402 -1483 
Calabria 1003 750 1754 1543 1216 890 3649 -1895 -1103 
Sicily 1390 986 2375 1642 1066 1060 3770 -1394 -736 
Sardinia 1475 933 2408 1617 1520 1347 4482 -2074 -1392 
Source: Own elaboration on Forte et al. (1978).  
Notes: Original data (in current Liras values) were first transformed in current euro values and then converted in constant 2010 Euros using a national-wide GDP deflator.  
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Table A3. Regional public revenues, expenditures and net fiscal flows in Italy, 1983-1985, yearly averages, per capita values in 2010 Euros. 
Regions 
Revenues Expenditures NFFs 
Tax 
revenues 
(1) 
Social security 
contributions 
Total 
(2) 
Social 
security 
payments 
Current  
Exp. 
(3) 
Capital Exp. 
 (4) 
Total 
(5) 
Total 
(2) – (5) 
Net of Social 
security 
(1) – (3) –(4) 
Piedmont 5354 3504 8857 4420 3229 775 8424 434 1350 
Aosta Valley 6106 3287 9393 4780 4362 3936 13078 -3685 -2192 
Lombardy 6191 3857 10048 3807 3196 751 7754 2294 2244 
TrentinoAlto Adige 5114 3253 8367 3808 4193 2952 10953 -2586 -2031 
Veneto 4806 3103 7909 3286 3393 801 7480 429 612 
FriuliVenezia Giulia 5126 3449 8575 4448 3916 1374 9739 -1163 -164 
Liguria 5344 3216 8561 4781 3887 1110 9779 -1218 347 
Emilia Romagna 5655 3437 9092 4107 3651 952 8710 382 1052 
Tuscany 5254 3253 8507 4140 3596 805 8542 -35 853 
Umbria 4016 2892 6907 4014 3752 1086 8852 -1944 -822 
Marche 4301 2972 7273 3680 3707 995 8381 -1108 -401 
Lazio 5407 3350 8756 3760 3366 1508 8634 122 533 
Abruzzo 3576 1603 5178 3385 3474 1537 8397 -3218 -1435 
Molise 2824 1888 4712 3281 3498 2017 8796 -4083 -2691 
Campania 2946 1902 4847 2935 3217 1258 7410 -2563 -1529 
Apulia 2847 1875 4722 3007 3220 871 7099 -2377 -1244 
Basilicata 2651 1768 4419 3167 3574 2755 9496 -5077 -3678 
Calabria 2496 1552 4047 2940 3415 1285 7640 -3592 -2204 
Sicily 2863 1718 4581 3134 3251 1179 7564 -2983 -1567 
Sardinia 3126 2005 5131 3245 3556 1484 8286 -3154 -1914 
Source: Own elaboration on ISTAT (1996).  
Notes: Original data (in current Liras values) were first transformed in current euro values and then converted in constant 2010 Euros using a national-wide GDP deflator.  
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Table A4. Regional public revenues, expenditures and net fiscal flows in Italy, 1986-1989, yearly averages, per capita values in 2010 Euros. 
Regions 
Revenues Expenditures NFFs 
Taxrevenu
es 
(1) 
Social security 
Contributions 
Total 
(2) 
Social 
Security 
Payments 
CurrentExp. 
(3) 
Capital Exp. 
(4) 
Total 
(5) 
Total 
(2) – (5) 
Net of Social 
security 
(1) – (3) – (4) 
Piedmont 6142 3738 9880 4405 3470 816 8691 1189 1856 
Aosta Valley 7278 3580 10857 5305 5060 4130 14496 -3638 -1912 
Lombardy 7155 4120 11276 4107 3407 748 8262 3014 3000 
TrentinoAlto Adige 5816 3475 9291 3957 4525 2396 10878 -1586 -1105 
Veneto 5492 3347 8839 3563 3630 870 8063 776 992 
FriuliVenezia Giulia 5677 3643 9320 4731 4179 1460 10370 -1050 38 
Liguria 5777 3426 9203 5210 4037 920 10168 -965 820 
Emilia Romagna 6389 3634 10023 4505 3854 880 9239 785 1655 
Tuscany 5622 3344 8966 4460 3810 801 9072 -106 1011 
Umbria 4552 3001 7553 4412 4049 1053 9514 -1961 -550 
Marche 4813 3113 7926 4000 3981 967 8950 -1023 -135 
Lazio 6074 3673 9747 3904 3514 1192 8611 1137 1368 
Abruzzo 4014 2308 6323 3709 3633 1325 8668 -2345 -944 
Molise 3235 2100 5335 3407 3770 1862 9039 -3704 -2397 
Campania 3172 1965 5137 3085 3476 1419 7980 -2843 -1723 
Apulia 3159 1980 5139 3240 3396 727 7364 -2225 -964 
Basilicata 2880 1929 4809 3305 3855 2476 9636 -4826 -3451 
Calabria 2683 1662 4345 3143 3626 1383 8151 -3807 -2326 
Sicily 3141 1833 4975 3513 3624 1297 8433 -3459 -1780 
Sardinia 3499 2179 5678 3402 3856 1361 8619 -2941 -1718 
Source: Own elaboration on ISTAT (1996).  
Notes: Original data (in current Liras values) were first transformed in current euro values and then converted in constant 2010 Euros using a national-wide GDP deflator.  
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Table A5. Regional public revenues, expenditures and net fiscal flows in Italy, 1990-1992, yearly averages, per capita values in 2010 Euros. 
Regions 
Revenues Expenditures NFFs 
Tax 
revenues 
(1) 
Social security 
Contributions 
Total 
(2) 
Social 
Security 
Payments 
CurrentExp. 
(3) 
Capital Exp. 
(4) 
Total 
(5) 
Total 
(2) – (5) 
Net of Social 
security 
 (1) – (3) – (4) 
Piedmont 7057 4283 11341 4955 3873 864 9693 1648 2320 
Aosta Valley 8607 3973 12579 5542 6218 3423 15183 -2604 -1034 
Lombardy 8445 4578 13023 4683 3786 774 9243 3780 3885 
TrentinoAlto Adige 6758 4047 10805 4651 5249 2758 12657 -1852 -1249 
Veneto 6564 3859 10423 4110 4024 841 8975 1447 1699 
FriuliVenezia Giulia 6860 4221 11081 5353 4577 1384 11313 -232 899 
Liguria 6936 3836 10771 5934 4517 1082 11533 -762 1337 
Emilia Romagna 7543 4124 11667 5185 4371 784 10340 1327 2388 
Tuscany 6569 3771 10340 5004 4255 923 10182 158 1391 
Umbria 5392 3401 8793 5003 4572 1043 10619 -1826 -223 
Marche 5637 3496 9133 4542 4414 856 9812 -679 367 
Lazio 7127 4188 11315 4461 3997 1488 9947 1369 1642 
Abruzzo 4790 2719 7509 4247 4073 1221 9541 -2032 -504 
Molise 3859 2440 6298 4021 4300 1715 10036 -3738 -2156 
Campania 3719 2242 5962 3446 4008 1235 8690 -2728 -1524 
Apulia 3723 2287 6010 3755 3737 707 8200 -2190 -721 
Basilicata 3383 2148 5532 3687 4260 2188 10135 -4603 -3065 
Calabria 3138 1866 5004 3757 4135 1327 9219 -4215 -2324 
Sicily 3779 2211 5990 4097 4351 1271 9718 -3728 -1843 
Sardinia 4225 2597 6822 3847 4456 1487 9791 -2969 -1718 
Source: Own elaboration on ISTAT (1996).  
Notes: Original data (in current Liras values) were first transformed in current euro values and then converted in constant 2010 Euros using a national-wide GDP deflator.  
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Table A6. Regional public revenues, expenditures and net fiscal flows in Italy, 1995-2010, yearly averages, per capita values in 2010 Euros. 
Regions 1995 1996-2002 2004-2006 2007-2010 
 Revenues Expenditures NFFs NFFs Revenues Expenditures NFFs NFFs 
Piedmont 11821 10915 906 2581 14187 12649 1539 1458 
Aosta Valley 13031 18272 -5241 -4175 16887 20922 -4034 -708 
Lombardy 13293 9410 3883 6014 16361 11196 5164 2585 
Trentino A. A. 11723 15874 -4151 -776 13220 14655 -1435 -1158 
Veneto 11350 9260 2090 3492 13137 10690 2446 764 
Friuli V. G. 11272 13269 -1997 894 13957 13834 123 722 
Liguria 11201 13957 -2756 -285 13050 14077 -1027 1703 
Emilia Romagna 12676 11032 1644 3908 15122 12299 2824 2080 
Tuscany 10895 10414 -519 1289 13458 12219 1239 693 
Umbria 9248 11357 -3109 -980 11643 13346 -1702 34 
Marche 9501 9570 -1069 661 11857 11451 406 -364 
Lazio 13217 10935 1282 2768 15118 12346 2772 2586 
Abruzzo 7817 10755 -2938 -957 9932 11248 -1316 -1234 
Molise 6860 11767 -4907 -3037 8418 12522 -4104 -1987 
Campania 5998 9632 -3634 -2368 7675 10340 -2665 -3174 
Apulia 6473 9964 -3491 -2076 7692 10266 -2574 -2398 
Basilicata 6326 11088 -4762 -3593 7840 12275 -4435 -2912 
Calabria 5208 11752 -6544 -4228 7266 11844 -4578 -3479 
Sicily 6188 11490 -5302 -3498 7902 11282 -3380 -3437 
Sardinia 7044 11821 -4777 -3217 9504 12799 -3295 -2658 
Source: Own elaboration on FondazioneAgnelli (1998) for 1995, Arachi et al. (2010) for 1996-2002, Staderini and Vadalà (2009) for 2004-2006 and Arachi et al. 
(2013) for 2007-2010. 
Notes: Original data (in current Liras values) were first transformed in current Euro values and then converted in constant 2010 Euros using a national-wide GDP 
deflator. Since Fondazione Agnelli (1998) does not supply data on social security payments, these are supposed to be equal in per capita terms to the values of 
1990-1992. Arachi et al. (2010) presents only data on net fiscal flows. The data in Arachi et al. (2013) regard only net fiscal flows as well; also, in this latter case 
data are adjusted so that the aggregate NFF is zero.  
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